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Abstract - The paper formalizes some of the interactions 
between inter-national and inter-temporal problems of 
policy coordination through the analysis of the 
implications of the synchronization (or not) of election 
dates on international policy cooperation. This makes it 
possible the determination of the gains and losses of 
international policy coordination and to an analysis of 
how the synchronization of election dates may help 
(electoral) international policy coordination. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent worldwide economic crisis has 
caused economic agents to be concerned with the 
design of institutions that, by their nature, will help 
overcome the problems that have affected many 
countries. In particular, the focus has been placed on 
how different countries can cooperate in putting into 
practice economic policies coordinated at 
international level in order to overcome the economic 
crisis. 
As a matter of fact, despite some interest in the 
design of international institutions (Morales & 
Padilla, 1995; Schubert & von Wangenheim, 2006) 
and a considerable interest in the international 
coordination of economic policies (Miller & Salmon, 
1990; Miller et al., 1991), the fact is that the electoral 
dimension in these matters was always an issue to 
which the literature has devoted little attention 
(Easaw & Garratt, 1996; Lohmann, 1993; Tabellini, 
1990). This is a disconcerting fact as it corresponds 
to an ignorance of an issue, i.e. the time horizons of 
governments (Caleiro, 2009), which is obviously 
relevant in the international coordination of economic 
policies within the framework of participation in 
some kind of economic institution. 
For instance, concerning the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, the European 
Commission (1997: 26) acknowledged at the time 
that giving up national monetary policy could involve 
costs if countries experienced de-synchronized 
business cycles. Despite this concern about the 
importance of business cycle synchronization, little 
research has been done on the importance of 
temporal horizons for business cycles 
synchronization and, to the best of our knowledge, 
almost none has been done on the impact of the 
synchronization of election dates on the 
synchronization of business cycles between 
economies. Some exceptions are Breuss (2008), 




In order to fill part of the gap in the literature, the 
paper formalizes some of the interactions between 
inter-national and inter-temporal problems of policy 
coordination through the analysis of the implications 
of the synchronization (or not) of election dates on 
international policy cooperation. In doing so, it is our 
objective also to help answering the following 
question: al cooperation or 
coordination of economic policies become easier or 
harder when domestic elections across countries are 
synchronized? , 1996: 11). Specifically, the 
paper adds to the literature by computing the 
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in a model 
where governments face elections at possibly distinct 
moments of time. This leads us to the determination 
of the gains and losses of international policy 
coordination and to an analysis of how the 
synchronization of election dates may help (electoral) 
international policy coordination.  
That said, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 presents the two-country model 
that will be used throughout the paper. Section 3 
presents the non-cooperative solution for the 
synchronized and non-synchronized elections cases. 
Section 4 presents the cooperative solutions for these 
two cases. Section 5 concludes by showing the 
circumstances under which is it better to have 
synchronized elections. 
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 Also, in Caleiro (2000) a difference games case was 
considered to study how distinct electoral period 
lengths may influence the benefits from international 
policy coordination.  
